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11 Introduction
A number of studies employ structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) to determine the roles of
monetary policy shocks in generating cyclical ﬂuctuations in the United States (e.g., Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999, and many others). Using both long- and short-run identifying
restrictions, various authors have explored the empirical response of the economy to exogenous
monetary innovations. While the majority of the studies of monetary policy have focused on the
eﬀect of exogenous money growth or interest rate shocks, recent research has begun to investigate
the eﬀect of endogenous monetary policy — that is, the central bank’s reaction to non-monetary
shocks. Many of these papers expand on the notion of a monetary policy rule introduced by
Taylor (1993). Taylor conjectured that the central bank responds to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
from a target and output from potential. Unfortunately, the vast majority of the empirical
studies investigating the monetary policy rules are decidedly divorced from consideration of the
forces driving these ﬂuctuations.
One exogenous shock that many economists believe contributes to the business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations that feed into the Taylor rule is the technology shock.1 In an eﬀort to identify the
empirical eﬀects of technology shocks, Gali (1999) estimated two models: a bivariate model of
productivity and hours and a ﬁve-variable model adding money, inﬂation, and interest rates. His
identiﬁcation estimates a decomposition of productivity and hours into innovations to technology
and non-technology components by assuming that only the former can have long-run eﬀects on
labor productivity.2,3
1We will at times refer to the technology shock as a productivity — or more speciﬁcally, a labor productivity
—s h o c k .
2Both models produced results that seemed contradict the technology-driven real business cycle hypothesis;
speciﬁcally, hours fell in response to a positive technology shock (i.e., a shock that raises labor productivity).
Gali, therefore, concluded that technology shocks were not the driving force behind macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
and that his non-technology shocks better explained the cyclical movements in the data.
3Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (1998) reached similar conclusions using alternative methods to identify technol-
ogy. They regressed the growth rate of output on the growth rate of inputs at a disaggregated level with proxies
for capacity utilization. Francis and Ramey (2002, 2003) further conﬁrmed the conculsions of Gali by examining
the exogeneity and pre-War technology shocks, respectively. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Viggfusson (2003)
oﬀered an alternative view, arguing against entering hours into the VAR in diﬀerences. Francis and Ramey
(2003), however, ﬁnd that labor entered in levels implies a series of implausibly (sizeable) positive technology
shocks during the Great Depression and the technology shocks so identiﬁed are Granger-caused by government
2Empirical identiﬁcation of the technology shock was a key ﬁrst step in developing a uniﬁed
reduced-form framework with which to examine the role that monetary policy has played in
smoothing economic ﬂuctuations.4 Along these lines, Gali (2002) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and
Valles (2003 — henceforth GLV) examined the endogenous response of monetary policy to iden-
tiﬁed technology shocks in the United States. GLV examine a four-variable structural VAR
for the United States with labor productivity, labor hours, the real interest rate, and inﬂation.
Using the Gali (1999) identiﬁcation, they ﬁnd that during the Volcker-Greenspan (VG) era the
Fed’s response to the technology shock is to raise the nominal interest rate, while during the
Martin-Burns-Miller (MBM) era the Fed lowers the nominal rate. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the
inﬂation and hours responses in the two periods diﬀer in sign.5
Our goal is to expand the scope of GLV to an international context to determine whether the
eﬀect of technology shocks is consistent across the major industrialized countries. In particular,
we are interested in how the diﬀerent central banks respond to technology shocks. We investigate
the possibility that technology shocks in diﬀerent countries produce fundamentally diﬀerent
inﬂation and employment responses and to what extent those eﬀects alter the monetary response.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the data we use for
empirical investigation and outlines the econometric technique and the identiﬁcation procedure.
Section 3 reviews the econometric results. In particular, we analyze the responses to the identiﬁed
technology shocks across countries and group the countries into three subgroups. Section 4
presents a model based on King and Wolman (1996) that provides a theoretical foundation for
discussion of the empirical response of monetary policy to innovations in labor productivity.
Section 5 oﬀers a number of parameterizations of the theoretical model that highlight potential
causes for variations in responses. Our goal will be to map the theoretical responses generated
spending, money, and prices.
4A number of papers have explored the role for monetary policy in a theoretical framework (see Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1999, and King and Wolman, 1999).
5They ﬁnd that during the BM era, hours and inﬂation fall persistently. On the other hand, during the
VG era, hours rise after a short decline and inﬂation is virtually unchanged. They conclude that the empirical
responses for the VG era match theoretical responses obtained from an inﬂation targeting rule. They further
conclude that there exists evidence against the use of a money money targeting rule during the BM era.
3from the model simulations to the empirical responses observed in the data. In section 6, we
consider the merit of these theoretical explanations by oﬀering some further empirical evidence.
Section 7 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2E c o n o m e t r i c F r a m e w o r k
To attribute cross-country diﬀerences to features of a theoretical model, we ﬁnd it prudent to ﬁrst
present the empirical ﬁndings. We employ the method of Gali (1999) to identify the technology
shocks. We discuss the speciﬁcation and the results of the estimation below. We characterize
three diﬀerent country-subgroups to facilitate discussion.
2.1 Data
We estimate a four-variable vector autoregression. The data used in the model are a short-term
nominal interest rate (either the 3-month T-bill rate or the short term money market rate) and
the logarithms of real per capita GDP, the GDP deﬂa t o r ,a n dt h ee m p l o y m e n ti n d e xf o rt h eG - 7
countries. We construct a labor productivity series by taking the diﬀerence between log(real per
capita GDP) and log(employment index).6 The frequency of the data are quarterly. Unit root
tests were conducted for all variables. The null hypothesis of no unit root was rejected for all
countries’ labor productivity series save Germany. Summary statistics for the variables used and
results of the unit root tests are included in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
For the United States, there is signiﬁcant evidence of a change in Federal Reserve policy
during the Volcker disinﬂation.7 In addition, the remainder of the countries in our sample
6Output does not enter explicitly into the model. Instead it can be imputed from the labor productivity and
labor index responses. Similarly, the model is estimated with the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate
response is imputed.
7The policy break literature is too vast for a comprehensive survey here. We direct the reader to two papers.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) provide evidence that the weight on inﬂation in the Fed’s objective function
4exhibit evidence of structural instability over the full sample. In order to ascertain a stable
sample for analysis, we conduct Lagrange Multiplier tests for each country to determine the
timing and signiﬁcance of a single structural break in the coeﬃcient matrix of the VAR.8 The
results of the structural break tests, including the break date, are included in Table 1. In most
cases (the U.S. and U.K. are exceptions), data limitations force us to constrain estimation of
post-break subsamples in circumstances in which breaks are signiﬁcant. The break date for
most countries occurs in the early 1970s. The dates correspond to a series of oil shocks (see
Hamilton, 1983) and the break up of the Bretton Woods system. France is an exception. For the
U.K. and the U.S., we follow GLV and estimate separately the pre- and post-Volcker disinﬂation
samples.9
2.2 Identiﬁcation
In order to evaluate the eﬀects of technology shocks and the subsequent monetary responses, we
specify a model in which we simultaneously identify both technology and monetary shocks. We
specify a structural VAR with restrictions on both the contemporaneous and long-run impacts of
monetary and technology shocks. Consider the MA representation of a four-variable structural
VAR:
Yt = C(L)εt, (1)
where
was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent during VG than during BM. Boivin and Giannoni (2002) argue that the Fed’s inﬂation
target declined in the VG period.
8We acknowledge that a single structral break as an alternative hypothesis is limiting. Data availability for
the G-7 countries, however, prevents us from estimating a more general model that we leave for future research.
9A number of studies of U.K. monetary history suggest a similarity between the U.S. and U.K. break dates
(we refer the reader to Nelson and Nikolov (2002) for a study examining the policies of the Bank of England
during the 1970s and 80s.). Our initial tests identiﬁed a break date of 1974:1, which we found was attributable
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C(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator, xt denotes the log of labor productivity, nt is the
the log of employment index, pt is the the log of GDP deﬂator, and rt is the three-month treasury
bill rate.10 We use four quarterly lags of each of the variables in the VARs. As per Table 1, we
tested and failed to reject unit roots for productivity, employment, and prices; therefore, these
variables enter the VAR in ﬁrst diﬀerences.11 Inﬂation and the real interest rate enter the VAR
in annualized rates.12
The long-run restrictions that identify the technology shock, εx,i m p l yC1j(1) = 0, j>1,
restricting the unit root in productivity to originate solely from the technology shock. In
addition, we impose short-run exclusion restrictions that allow us to identify the monetary shock,
εr.13 This shock is identiﬁed from a contemporaneous impact matrix which imposes a Cholesky
ordering on the model variables. The assumptions identifying monetary innovation is that it
does not have contemporaneous eﬀects and that the monetary authority takes all other variables
in the VAR into consideration when setting policy.14
10The treasury bill rate is assumed to respresent the monetary policy instrument. We use the T-bill rate as
it is the only short term interest rate common to all countries. Results using the T-bill rate were found to be
consistent with those replacing the T-bill with the federal funds rate for U.S. data.
11The exception here is Germany’s employment series, which is entered in detrended levels.
12We also considered a seven-variable VECM that included consumption, investment and velocity. Results for
the four variables of interest were unchanged.
13Note we can potentially identify all the shocks in the system since the C(0) matrix is fully recursive.
14The model as it stands is overidentiﬁed. A just identiﬁed model would require 6 additional identifying
assumptions. Our speciﬁcation delivers 9 such restrictions, 3 from the long run assumptions and 6 from the C(0)
matrix. We experimented with relaxing some of these restrictions and allow more coeﬃcients in C(0) to be free
parameters. Our results remained robust across these alterations.
63 Empirical Results
Based on the identifying assumptions outlined in the previous section, we could potentially
generate impulse responses to both technology and monetary shocks in the four-variable model.
However, we concentrate our eﬀorts on the responses to technology shocks and the responses of
monetary instruments to such shocks.15 We note here that productivity and, hence, output for
each country respond as expected yielding permanent increases in each variable.16
Figure 1 about here
To ease comparison of the results across studies, we ﬁrst present the response to a one stan-
dard deviation technology shock for the post-Volcker—disinﬂation United States in Figure 1.
The estimated technology shock induces a short, statistically-signiﬁcant decline in employment.
After a few quarters, employment rises persistently. Moreover, the technology shock is deﬂa-
tionary, leading to a two-year period in which prices permanently decline. Although the shock
is deﬂationary, the Fed increases the nominal interest rate leading to a short-run rise in the real
rate.
These results, consistent with GLV, might suggest that during the Volcker-Greenspan era,
the Fed employs an optimal monetary rule. In this case, the Fed may be responding to the
productivity shock by raising the nominal rate—and, thus, the real rate—in order to suppress
inﬂationary expectations. The Fed achieves, according to the empirical evidence, long-run price
stability but does not completely damp out all of the short-run price eﬀects.
15We consider the monetary shock to determine whether restrictions identifying the technology shocks aversely
aﬀect the response of the monetary shock. We ﬁnd that the responses to the monetary shock have the expected
shape (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998) and, thus, we are reassured that monetary shock is robust to the identica-
tion of the technology shock using Gali’s (1999) method. For brevity, we refer the reader to the usual literature
in exogenous monetary shocks (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; and
Leeper, Sims, and Zha, 1996).
16The diﬀerence in the U.S. and U.K. inﬂation and interest rate responses before and after the breaks lead us
to analyze the two subperiods for each country separately. We will refer to the pre- and post-break subsamples
explcitly.
7Figure 2 about here
In order to facilitate further discussion, we collect the remaining countries (including the pre-
Volcker U.S.) into three subgroups based on the response of their central banks to the technology
shock and the attributes of the shock itself (i.e., its impact on prices and employment). The
point estimates for the impulse responses of both real and nominal interest rates, inﬂation, and
employment to a one standard deviation technology shock for the ﬁrst country grouping (France,
Japan, and the post-break U.K.) are depicted in Figure 2. Employment for these countries,
while declining in the short-run, rises overall.17
For this ﬁrst grouping, the central bank raises the real interest rate in response to a technology
shock. The real interest rate for three of the four countries declines in the short-run. However,
for all four countries, it rises within a few quarters and remains either positive or statistically
negligible.18 Long-run stabilization of the real rate is accomplished through a rise in the nominal
interest rate in response to an increase in prices and employment. The real rate falls in the
short-run in three countries because of the immediate increase in inﬂation. The central bank’s
response occurs at a lag, leaving the nominal interest rate unchanged in the short-run.
Figure 3 about here
The impulse responses to the technology shock for the second country group—consisting of
Canada, Germany, the pre-break U.K., and the United States (MBM)—are reported in Figure 3.19
This group is characterized by a decline in the nominal rate and relatively persistent declines
in employment (usually more than 17 quarters) and inﬂation. This persistent reduction in
employment is theoretically consistent with a job destructive technology shock (see Caballero
17France’s labor response is slightly diﬀerent. It rises in the short to medium run but turns negative after 15
quarters.
18The slow in the response of the real interest rate may be interpreted as central bank reaction time or monetary
policy lags.
19It is important to reiterate that we could not reject the null hypothesis of no unit root in Germany’s produc-
tivity series and that the model was estimated with detrended employment.
8and Hammour, 1994).
A cursory examination of the monetary response for this group, characterized by a decrease in
the nominal interest rate, might indicate a diﬀerence in the behavior of monetary policy from the
ﬁrst country grouping. The monetary authority appears to be accommodating the technology
shock, lowering nominal rates in the face of falling employment. The third panel of Figure 3,
however, shows that countries in this group either raise or hold real interest rates constant in
the long-run in response to the shock. Since these countries experience deﬂationary technology
shocks, the central bank maintains the real interest rate via a reduction in the nominal interest
rates.
Figure 4 about here
The ﬁnal country to be considered is Italy, whose impulse responses are shown in Figure
4. Italy is characterized by a technology shock that induces a negative comovement between
inﬂation and employment. Here, the response of employment to the technology shock is a
persistent reduction in labor, consistent with the responses of the countries in group 2. However,
in contrast to the countries in group 2, prices rise in response to the technological innovation.
The monetary authority responds to the technology shock by increasing the nominal interest
rate. The net eﬀect is to counterbalance rising inﬂation’s eﬀect on the real interest rate. The
Bank of Italy, thus, initially accommodates the decline in employment but eventually raises real
interest rates in response to inﬂation.
It comes as no surprise that the central banks in our sample respond diﬀerently to technology
shocks. This is especially true given that the labor and price response varies considerably across
countries. However, in each case, the central bank acts to increase the real interest rate in
response to the shock, regardless of the direction of the inﬂation response.20 In order to explain
this cross-country variation, we propose a representative agent model in the following section.
20In some cases, the central bank is not entirely successful in increasing or maintaining the real interest rate.
We, however, focus on the comovement between inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. In all cases, the
comovement is positive.
94M o d e l
The model we present is adapted from King and Wolman (1996) and incorporates both a tech-
nology shock and a monetary policy reaction function. The model examines the optimization
problems of ﬁrms and workers and the dynamic responses to idiosyncratic technology shocks
under diﬀering monetary policy rules. The nature of the impulse responses to a technology
shock will hinge on whether the policy of the central bank is money supply growth targeting or
employing a Taylor rule.
Our model is a representative agent model with a central bank. The household maximizes
lifetime utility subject to time and budget constraints. Additionally, households experience a
time cost of acquiring consumption goods—a shopping time. Firms maximize proﬁts under a
Calvo (1983) pricing scheme. Finally, the central bank can adopt either a Taylor rule or money
supply growth targeting rule.
4.1 The Household’s Problem
The household’s current period utility depends on its level of consumption and leisure:
Ut =l nct + φlnlt,
where ct is consumption, lt is leisure, and φ is a weighting factor. The household’s problem is
























10and a normalized working day
nt+j + lt+j + ht+j =1 .
Here, β and ∆ are discount factors; mt is real money balances; Pt is the price level; wt is the
real wage; Rt is the nominal interest rate; nt and lt are labor and leisure, respectively; and ht is
shopping time. Shopping time captures the fact that it is costly, in terms of time, to undertake



















with h0(.) < 0.
4.2 The Firm’s Problem
We assume ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors. A ﬁrm’s decision depends on its current capital
stock kt and the expectation of the future consumption good price Pt+j and real wage wt+j.





∆t,j[Pt+jyt+j − Pt+jwt+jnt+j − Pt+jit+j]
subject to a constant returns to scale production technology
yt+j = At+jf (nt+j,k t+j) (2)
and an investment constraint











is a positive, increasing, and concave function
that represents the increasing cost of augmenting capital too rapidly.
Firms set prices according to the staggered price setting scheme of Calvo (1983), with prob-
ability η ﬁrms do not adjust prices and with probability 1 − η they do. This implies that the
fraction of ﬁr m st h a tl a s ta d j u s t e dp r i c ej periods ago is given by,
θj =( 1− η)η
j.












t−j is the price chosen by ﬁrms who adjusted their price j periods ago.
The coeﬃcient At+j in (2) is a productivity shifter which we will identify as the level of
technology. Shocks to At+j will be interpreted as shocks to technology; we model these shocks
as random walk processes, thus, introducing some persistence into the model. Our primary
interest is to determine the central bank’s reaction and the subsequent dynamic response of
model variables to innovations in At+j under alternate policy rules.
4.3 Monetary Policy Rules and First-Order Conditions
In addition to the behavior of the agents, the rule followed by the monetary authority will
inﬂuence the responses of the economy to a technology shock. We assume that the monetary
authority can adopt one of two policy rules:
1. Taylor Rule: The central bank manipulates interest rates each period to achieve a given
annualized inﬂation rate target π∗. The policy rule would be of the form:
Rt = Rt−1 + a(yt − y
∗)+b(πt − π
∗)
12where y∗ is potential output.
2. Money Supply Targeting: The central bank targets the rate of growth of money supply.
That is, money growth is held constant.
log(mt) − log(mt−1)=ϕ
where mt is the quantity of money.
The endogenous reaction of monetary policy to the technology shock will depend on which
of the two policy rules the monetary authority chooses to adopt. Given the set up of the model,
the following ﬁrst order conditions obtain:
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t = Zt Capital Decision,
where Zt is the rental price of capital, γt and λt are shadow prices and α is the share of labor
in the production function. These ﬁrst-order conditions allow us to simulate the model and
determine the policy reaction and subsequent theoretical responses to innovations to technology.
135 Simulations
The model that we have presented above consists of a few key parameters that can aﬀect
the shapes—and more importantly, the signs—of the theoretical impulse responses to technol-
ogy shocks. In particular, we explore diﬀerences induced by the two policy rules (Taylor rule or
money growth targeting) and by changes in the cost of capital adjustment.21 I nT a b l e2 ,w eo ﬀer
four model parameterizations that characterize a variety of alternative responses to a positive
technology shock. The diﬀerences in the price responses underlies variations in the employment
response to technological innovations.
Table 2 about here
Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 plots the theoretical impulse responses of selected variables to a one percent positive
shock to technology under the Taylor rule for the ﬁrst parameterization, which we henceforth term
a creative technology shock.22 The theoretical technology shock causes a level shift in output
that in turn requires, from the ﬁrst-order conditions, that the capital-labor ratio increase. Since
the cost of adjusting capital is suﬃciently low, when labor increases due to the rise in average
productivity, capital responds positively to the shock. Thus, a productivity shock causes an
increase in output that exceeds the shift in potential and, thus, leads to an increase in prices.
The central bank, with a stable Taylor rule (in the sense of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000),
responds by raising both the nominal and real interest rates to counteract rising prices.
21We considered but do not report changes in the agents’ relative valuation of leisure to consumption, the time
cost of purchasing consumption goods, and the rate at which ﬁrms can change prices. We found that these
parameters are not key to explaining cross-country diﬀerences in the monetary response to technology shocks.
They may, however, be valuable in explaining other business cycle variables including, for example, the eﬀect of
technology on consumption. We leave this for future research.
22This parameterization in this simulation has 25 percent of ﬁrms adjusting their prices, a relatively low cost of
adjusting investment, and a feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation relative to output greater than 1 in the Taylor rule
equation.
14Figure 6 about here
The second and third parameterizations are presented together in Figure 6. These parame-
terizations exemplify how both a monetary targeting rule and a Taylor rule can produce similar
theoretical responses.23 One major diﬀerence between these two speciﬁc a t i o n si sh o wt h ed e c l i n e
in employment is generated. When the policymaker employs a Taylor rule in this parametriza-
tion, high adjustment costs cause a rigidity in the capital market. The shift in the level of output
again indicates an increase in the capital-labor ratio that can only be achieved by a short-run
reduction in employment. This decline in employment endures until ﬁrms can adjust their
capital stock. Suﬃciently rigid capital markets can therefore produce persistent employment
reductions. Since the central bank’s Taylor rule in this parameterization places a relatively high
weight on output, the level shift in output causes the policymaker to underestimate the necessary
reduction in the nominal interest rate. The change in the real interest rate is positive and prices
fall. We henceforth term this parameterization a destructive technology shock.24
In the case of the money growth targeting, the level shift in output forces the consumer to
spend more time shopping. In the previous parameterization, the central bank injects liquidity
by dropping the interest rate, thereby decreasing the shopping time cost. Here, the central
bank holds the money growth rate constant. Thus, agents switch out of leisure and labor into
purchase of consumption goods. In this case, the decline in employment obtains not from a
rigidity in the capital market but from a rigidity induced by the central bank’s policy rule. The
relative tightness in money also produces the decline in prices.
Figure 7 about here
23Later, we will consider empirical methods of distinguishing between the two types of policy rules.
24A negative employment response also may reﬂect the possibility that a dominant wealth eﬀect drives down
employment and causes the technology shock to be deﬂationary. After a positive productivity shock, ﬁrms’
markups rise, increasing the wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and the real wage. Because this
wedge is expected to diminish over time, expected real wages rise and agents reduce their short-run labor supplied
due to the intertemporal substitution eﬀect.
15Finally, we present a fourth parameterization that reﬂects a policymaker with Taylor rule
with an low (and unstable) weight on inﬂation but an even lower weight on output.25 As in
the second parameterization, a high capital adjustment cost makes employment decline. In this
case, the central bank does not respond to output but instead responds to the upward pressure
on prices by raising the nominal interest rate. However, since the coeﬃcient on inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
p o l i c y m a k e r ’ sT a y l o rr u l ei sl e s st h a nu n i t y ,t h em a g n i t u d eo ft h er e s p o n s ei si n s u ﬃcient to fully
balance the pressure on prices and inﬂation rises.
6 Explaining Cross-Country Diﬀerences
In the previous section, we show that diﬀerences in the theoretical responses to the technology
shock can be attributed to either diﬀerences in the monetary authority’s rule (i.e., stable/unstable
Taylor rule or money growth targeting) or the degree of rigidity in the adjustment of the capital
stock. We have shown the empirical impulse responses from section 3 diﬀer across countries.
Here, we consider whether variation in the parameters that spur diﬀerences in the theoretical
model can be possible explanations for these empirical cross-country diﬀerences.
Apart from the U.S. (VG) responses, the remaining countries (including the U.S. (MBM) pe-
riod) seem to be well characterized by diﬀerences in the three key elements: the variable targeted
by the central bank, the parameters of the policy rule, and capital market rigidities.26 However,
before we conclude that these diﬀerences in the impulse responses can truly be attributed to
these the country characteristics, we explore further evidence. We conduct these tests in this
section.
25This parameterization produces a near random walk in interest rates.
26We note here that GLV concluded that the U.S. (VG) period can be characterized by an optimal monetary
policy rule. We refrain from further discussion of this period and, instead, focus on the nature of remaining
cross-country variation.
166.1 Tests of Monetary Targeting
For the four countries in group 2, we are unable to distinguish theoretically between the responses
of a country with a money growth rule with ﬂexible capital markets and a country with an
unstable Taylor rule with rigid capital markets. Empirically, we can test whether the central
bank appears to be conducting policy as though it were targeting a money growth rate. Thus,
we reestimate the model including a monetary aggregate in the monetary policy block. Results
for the four countries in group 2 are presented in ﬁgure 8.
Figure 8 about here
During the sample periods, the responses of the money growth rate in Canada and Germany
are statistically negligible. This suggests that these countries, indeed, seem to behave as though
they target a money growth rate. On the other hand, the U.S. (MBM) period results are
consistent with GLV. The response of money to the technology shock for the United States
(MBM) is wildly varying and not suggestive of the Fed targeting a money growth rate. For
the pre-break U.K., a technology shock causes a long-run increase in the money growth rate,
providing some evidence against money targeting by the Bank of England. However, unlike
GLV, our theoretical model allows us to make a further test of money targeting by considering
the rigidity of capital markets.
6.2 Tests of Capital Adjustment
Under the Taylor rule speciﬁcation, the direction of the theoretical response of employment
depends on the cost of adjusting capital. While a direct measure of the cost is unavailable, we
consider a proxy of the capital market rigidity in the volatility of quarterly investment. We posit
that a higher the capital adjustment cost implies a greater the rigidity in the capital market and,
thus, lower the investment volatility. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows the detrended investment
17volatility for each country.27
Table 3 about here
The theoretical model predicts that all the countries in group 1 (France, Japan, and the
post-break U.K.) and the potential money growth targeting countries in group 2 (Canada and
Germany) have low capital adjustment costs and, thus, more volatile investment. On the other
hand, the pre-break U.K., the U.S. (MBM), and Italy should have high capital adjustment
costs and, thus, less volatile investment. Although only suggestive, the ordinal ranking of
the investment volatilities does bear close resemblance to the prediction. Only Germany has
investment volatility below countries inconsistent with the predicted result.28
6.3 Taylor Rule Coeﬃcients
A ﬁnal theoretical implication of the model is that, in order to match the empirical responses, the
degree of output and inﬂation sensitivity in the policymaker’s Taylor rule must vary. In order to
uncouple the price and employment response for Italy, the Taylor rule implied by the empirical
model must be unresponsive to output and inﬂation. While the empirical model does not
explicitly generate estimates for the policymaker’s Taylor rule, because the policy block is ordered
last in the VAR, the coeﬃcients in the interest rate equation can be taken to approximate the total
responsiveness to output and inﬂation. To reveal whether the empirical results are consistent
with our theoretical interpretation, we compare some benchmark Taylor rule coeﬃcients from the
literature. The results are shown in Table 3.29 Since, these studies explicitly set out to model
27Further research might examine more disaggregated measures of investment or capital stock volatility.
28This may suggest that Germany and the pre-break U.K., although appearing to target the money growth
rate in Figure 8, are actually Taylor rule countries. Also, the model does not suggest a particular cutoﬀ for the
investment volatility. Again, we emphasize that results in this section are merely suggestive.
29Note there are features of the model, such as capital adjustment cost and shopping time, not captured in
the empirical section which negates any direct comparison of the policy reaction functions - theoretical and
empirical. However, we proceed with the comparison under the assumption that either these factors do not aﬀect
(contemporaneous) output and employment found in the Taylor rule or their inﬂuence is not suﬃcient to render
the comparison useless.
18and estimate monetary policy reaction functions, in this regard, they provide more accurate
coeﬃcients than our empirical estimates.
Three key results are suggested from the Taylor Rule equations obtained from the literature.
First, the Taylor rule for each of the group 1 countries has an inﬂation coeﬃcient statistically
equal to or greater than 1 and an output coeﬃcient less than 0.5. This is consistent with
the parameterization from our theoretical model and the relatively high investment volatility
discussed in the previous section. Second, the pre-break Bank of England appears relatively too
responsive to ﬂuctuations in output versus inﬂation. This, coupled with the U.K.’s relatively low
investment volatility, supports the hypothesis that the pre-break U.K. is, in fact, an "unstable"
Taylor rule country rather than a money growth targeting country. Germany, on the other hand,
appears to have a stable Taylor rule, which is inconsistent with theory. This leads us to believe
that Germany is, indeed, money growth targeting, a results consistent with previous literature
(Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1998). Third, the Bank of Italy appears relatively
unresponsive (compared to model predictions) to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. In combination with
its relatively low investment volatility, Italy’s responses are consistent with our theoretical model
that includes high capital adjustment costs and an unstable Taylor rule.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we extend the empirical analysis of Gali (1999) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles
(2003) to an international context. We ﬁnd considerable cross-country variation in the response
to the identiﬁed technology shock. In particular, we identify three subgroups consisting of
countries whose responses are similar in shape and direction. The two elements that charac-
terize these diﬀerences are the direction of the price/employment/interest rate response and the
comovement between employment and prices. One ﬁnding of particular interest is that the iden-
tiﬁed responses during the Volcker-Greenspan era are not replicated in any other G-7 country
19during any time period.30
Using a theoretical model adapted from King and Wolman (1996), we ﬁnd that the empirical
responses can be matched with theoretical responses. Diﬀerences in these theoretical responses
can be attributed to alternative policy rules and changes in the cost of capital adjustment.
Further tests verify that these country characteristics could, indeed, have some explanatory
power. While our results are by no means conclusive, they do suggest a number of theoretically
consistent similarities across countries in each subgroup. While we believe more investigation into
these cross-country comparisons is warranted, the initial indication is that the manner in which
monetary policy is conducted and the degree of rigidity in capital markets may be determining
factors in a country’s response to technology shocks.
30We ﬁnd this of interest since GLV conclude the conduct of the Fed during this period can be construed as
theoretically optimal.
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CANADA 1970:1 - 2002:2 1976:3 125.72 1976:3 - 2002:2
FRANCE 1978:1 - 1998:4 1983:1 130.41 1983:1 - 1998:4
GERMANY 1970:1 - 1998:4 1974:4 134.66 1974:4 - 1998:4
ITALY 1971:1 - 1998:4 1976:2 199.59 1976:2 - 1998:4
JAPAN 1970:1 - 2002:2 1975:1 172.20 1975:1 - 2002:2
UK 1960:1 - 2002:2 1974:1 154.31
UK-pre 1960:1 - 1979:2
UK-post 1982:3 - 2002:3
US 1960:1 - 2002:3 1981:1 128.00
US-pre 1960:1 - 1979:2
US-post 1982:3 - 2002:3
Note: Structural break dates were determined based on the subsample stability of the coefficient matrix 
with productivity and employment in differences, and inflation and the interest rate in levels.
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of the Growth Rates Over the Estimated Periods
Productivity Employment Inflation Interest Rate
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
CANADA -0.03 0.33 0.19 0.24 -0.02 1.14 8.33 3.68
FRANCE -0.22 2.93 0.07 0.12 -0.04 0.73 7.32 3.10
GERMANY 0.06 1.00 0.03 0.24 -0.03 2.47 5.55 2.33
ITALY 0.18 0.37 0.05 0.27 -0.06 1.38 11.76 4.88
JAPAN 0.18 0.40 0.08 0.15 -0.06 1.08 4.43 3.20
UK
UK-pre 0.29 0.47 0.02 0.21 0.10 2.50 5.93 1.62
UK-post 0.13 0.37 0.05 0.22 -0.07 1.95 9.18 3.19
US
US-pre -0.01 0.43 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.58 5.49 2.41
US-post 0.05 0.37 0.17 0.18 -0.03 0.41 6.59 2.77
Panel C: T-stats From Unit Root Tests
DICKEY-FULLER PHILLIPS-PERRON
PROD EMPL INFL RATE PROD EMPL INFL RATE
CANADA -3.12 -0.83 -1.61 -1.59 -2.78 -0.82 -3.62 -1.64
FRANCE -0.64 -0.42 -2.95 -1.86 -1.42 1.50 -4.68 -1.67
GERMANY -2.75 -1.94 -3.14 -2.60 -3.10 -0.75 -9.76 -2.28
ITALY -1.52 -1.18 -1.54 -0.94 -1.08 -1.39 -3.85 -1.01
JAPAN -1.32 -1.93 -2.51 -1.44 -1.77 -2.96 -4.46 -2.45
UK-pre 0.21 -1.62 -1.07 -0.90 0.49 -1.96 -7.26 -0.40
UK-post -1.03 -1.06 -3.58 -1.74 -1.04 0.12 -3.72 -1.92
US-pre -1.23 -0.08 -1.01 -1.17 -1.08 0.70 -1.45 0.15
US-post -1.79 -2.14 -2.90 -3.44 -0.88 -1.19 -5.33 -2.55
Values significant at the 10% level are bolded.
Note: The variables were tested for unit root in levels.
Note: Germany was estimated with a linearly detrended productivity variable in levels.Table 2: Model Parametrization










Own price elasticity (ε)               4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
Probability firm does not adjust price (η) 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.75
Multiplicative term on h() function (ζ) 0.0116 0.0116 0.0116 0.0116
Curvature of h() function (υ) 0.8004 0.8004 0.8004 0.8004
Shift term in h() function (κ) 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
Labor share (α) 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3
Quarterly depreciation rate (δ) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Quarterly inflation rate (5% annually) (π) 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122
Investment adjustµεντ cost parameter (ξ)  0.5 0.5 20 20
Utility discount factor (β) 0.9917 0.9917 0.9917 0.9917
Inflation Coefficient in Taylor Rule 1.5 n/a 0.5 0.2








a   0.27**
Japan 20.70 2.04
a 0.08
UK - post 13.76 0.98
a 0.19
Group 2
Canada 12.71    2.25
d,***    0.92***
Germany 2.85 1.31
a 0.25
UK - pre 4.72 0.315
c 0.52
US - pre 7.35 0.86
b 0.39
Group 3 6.14 0.91
a   0.10**
Italy
* Gross Fixed Capital Formation
** Includes coefficient on relative price of domestic currency to an EU area bundle of prices.
*** Coefficients estimated with the assumption of a forward-looking Taylor Rule, and a backward-looking inflation target rule. 
**** Since Germany was estimated with a linearly detrended labor coefficient, its 
output coefficient is not directly comparable to that of the other countries.
Taylor Rule Coefficients Extracted From:
a Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
b Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998)
c Nelson and Nikolov (2002)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sFigure 8: Empirical Response of Monetary Aggregates to a Technology Shock 
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Canada, Germany, US UK